In fact, there was a moment in the 2nd half, near the end, when Puyol when to the sideline and said to Pep that he was so tired and could use a substitution. Pep, from the sideline, told him he would hold until the end of the match in a very catalan expression (literally translating to "by my balls you end the match". In catalan doesn't sound so bold, mind you). So Puyol had to endure the last 10 minutes.
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Wednesday, 21 December 2011
A guy who was in the stands of the 1-3 El Clásico shares a story he happened to witness:
Monday, 19 December 2011
Ce mă freacă lăbăreala din ziare.
De fiecare dată când Barcelona reuşeşte ceva interesant (slavă nu-ştiu-cui, ultima vreme s-a întâmplat des!) intru pe toate ziarele să văd comparativ modul de prezentare şi impresia lăsată. Presa e ridicolă. Dar mai tare decât cele aservite Barcelonei, care fie că echipa joacă bine, fie rău - au numai titluri gen "magnific, superb, regi" bla-bla sunt cele aservite Madridului. Care, spaniole fiind TREBUIE să raporteze destul de detaliat succesul rivalei, însă totodată TREBUIE să menţină Realul într-un mod pozitiv pe prima copertă. Preferabil ca Lideres.
La succesele europene am observat, totuşi, că pe măsură ce echipa lui Guardiola a câştigat mai multe trofee şi ei prezintă mai pozitiv succesul. Ca şi cum - da, stim că sunt tari, noi spaniolii suntem tari - spre deosebire de titlurile vechi gen controversă la succesul Barcelonei. E adevărat, schimbarea a fist accentuată logaritmic după succesul Spaniei la CM.
În disputele cu Madrid iarăşi am observat că faţă de acum câţiva ani (când un 6-2 sau titlu intern câştigat era privit ca bulănos şi cu ciudă) acum tonul este mai degrabă critic la adresa Madridului, lui Ronaldo şi chiar Mourinho. Barcelona în schimb este privită cu oarecare simpatie, mângâiată cu epitete gen "meritat, sunt mai buni" - nici pe ultima controversă cu rosu-ul lui Messi nebătându-se prea mult toaca. Un fel de "da, merita roşu, dar asta tot nu scuză că noi aveam 1-0, 9 puncte şi nu am jucat nimic. Dacă nu acum, atunci când?"
Mai demult de la un insucces cu Barcelona treceau 2 zile (adică O copertă în care Barça să fie prezentată bulănos) până iarăşi pe copertă apărea o poză sexy cu Benzema, Ronaldo sau Kaka anunţând "glorie" în viitor şi cât de buni sunt ei de fapt. Chestii normale dacă vrei să-ţi lingi rănile, dar care arată destul de LAME. Acum e... diferit.
Însă pentru suportul (moral) al echipei şi al fanilor descumpăniţi de încă un insucces cu Barcelona e nevoie şi să priveşti statisticile diferit, să cauţi un semn bun. Care - în lumea statisticilor e întotdeauna greu de găsit.
Astfel, dacă titlul din 2011 a fost pierdut şi cel din 2012 are şi el şanse să fie la fel Realul se mângâie. In anul CALENDARISTIC 2011 ei au câştigat Liga, obţinând cu 3 puncte mai mult ca Barcelona. Chestie de moral. Mie ca fan al Madridului energie mi-ar da faptul că pur şi simplu echipa asta NU pierde cu echipele mici, le rupe - nu că "tehnic în 2011 am scos mai multe puncte" - pentru că acolo sunt multe steluţe. Poate (nu îmi amintesc) ăia aveau 3-5 puncte avans la intrarea în ianuarie, poate au câştigat anticipat campionatul şi şi-au băgat juniorii, etc.
La fel cum aş fi mândru de Ronaldo că e jucător bun şi dă goluri, dar nu neapărat să consider faptul că Pichichi-ul e DOVADA acestui fapt. Odată ce titlul era matematic la rivali îmi amintesc un Ronaldo care a dat vreo 10 goluri în 3 sau 4 meciuri, când Messi nu mai jucase deloc fiind înainte de finala Ligii. Pe lângă că oricum un seyon mai bun ca al adversarului nu spune neapărat că eşti mai bun, datorită asemenor tehnicalităţi e al dracului de greu şi să faci o statistică faţă-în-faţă.
Dar articolul cu "Realul, campioana anului 2011" îşi avea locul frumos pe prima pagină a site-ului Marca. În stânga în schimb era "Santos - Barcelona 0-4. Barcelona, Regi." lucru care ca suporter m-ar face să mă ruşinez. Ştiu că sunt defazat fiind fan Barcelona, doar că am pretenţia de puţină obiectivitate când spun că dacă Realul ne-ar fi scos în semifinale cu victorie pe Camp Nou, ar fi câştigat Liga Campionilor şi apoi şi-ar fi câştigat biletele la Campionatul Mondial Al Cluburilor unde ar fi înregistrat cel mai bun parcurs din istoria competiţiei, împotriva unei echipe de la care vine marea mea speranţă pentru detronarea lor (redus la anonimitate de jocul adversarilor şi al unui moşuleţ de 33 de ani care tocmai mi-a anulat superstarul cu 8 zile n urmă LA mine acasă În timp ce aveam 9 puncte virtuale în faţa lor în campionat) nu m-ar fi prea încălzit o victorie cu 6 goluri împotriva Sevillei sau faptul că "tehnic" suntem campionii anului.
Iar ca dovadă am faptul că mi-a fost rece în 2003-2004 când Barcelona, la primul an al lui Rijkaard a reuşit cel mai tare retur de campionat din istoria sa, cu vreo 15 victorii consecutive printre care şi una pe Santiago Bernabeu. Păcat că terminase turul sezonului cu 12 puncte în spatele Realului. Valencia avea să ia titlul acela, oricum. Dat fiind turul sezonului 2004-2005 (primul cu Eto'o, victorie cu 3-0 în El Clasico, lideri detaşaţi) aş putea fi şi eu mândru că am fost campionii morali ai anului 2004. Doar că... primul titlu de când sunt eu fan Barcelona avea să vină tot în vara 2005, iar 2004 avea să rămână doar "anul în care Ronaldinho a stopat sentimentul meu de impotenţă cu Realul". Lucrur pe care Ronaldo nu l-a prea reuşit încă. Încă.
Trebuie să fiu sincer. Da, Realul arată bine (ok - nu arată deloc rău vreau să zic), dar - DA, mă bucur că nu sunt fan al lor pentru că mie îmi pare că m-aş fi simţit umilit prea des. Şi cu siguranţă nu aş fi lăsat Marca să-mi lingă rănile. La unii o merge mici semne că totuşi suntem buni, dar la mine nu. Nu declaraţii bombastice după care să facă mişto în caricaturi îia din Sport sau EMD... doar jocul poate să mă convingă. Şi - revin - îmi plăcea jocul Barcelonei chiar fără trofee de cand mă uit la fotbal. Nu credeam să ajungă clubul vreodată aşa dominant, cu atât de mult succes şi stil. Cel mai tare (dintre oponenţii pe teren) mi-ar fi plăcut să fiu jucător la Santos. Ăia aveau aşteptări dar se aşteptau şi să o muşte. Mi-ar fi plăcut să mă recunosc învins şi să strâng mâna Barcelonei de pe teren.
Mi-o atras atenţia unu' că Nenea Neymar, pe cat de fiţos şi crestos se zice că e (şi poate e), e dus puţin în inaginea aia şi de presă/Péle pentru că dacă citeşti doar replicile lui din interviuri pare destul de modest. Iar ieri a fost.
Paralela
Mică şi superficială paralelă a coincidenţelor şi complexelor între Manchester City şi City-ul Madrilen. Cu steluţă.
vara 2008.
City (Madrid) primeşte o infuzie de bani şi anunţă că vrea gloria. Şef (preşedinte) nou, încep transferurile bombă.
2008-2009
Rivala, United (Barcelona), ia titlul cu câteva etape înainte de final şi ajunge în finală (câştigă) UEFA Champions League.
2009-2010
Mai mulţi bani băgaţi, iarăşi niciun trofeu, pentru City (Madrid) sau United (steluţa - Barcelona ia titlul)
2010-2011
United (Barcelona) ia titlul cu câteva etape înainte de final şi ajunge în finala (câştigă) Champions League. Dar City (Madrid) reuşeşte să stopeze seceta câştigând Cupa învingând surprinzător United-ul (Barcelona) cu 1-0 în semifinală (finală). Bla-bla, dovadă că până la urmă banii investiţi nu au fost în van, urmează lucruri mari, etc.
2011-2012
Un City (Madrid) readus la viaţă de către trofeul proaspăt câştigat dispută Supercupa cu Marele Rival, United (Barcelona) dar deşi aşteptările sunt mari, pierde trofeul - cu lupii bătrâni nu te pui.
În campionat, spre finalul turului, City (Madrid) pare mult mai stabilită, conducând cu 2 (3) puncte în faţa lui United (Barcelona) şi având multe rezultate-bombă de genul un_număr_mult_mai_mare_de_3-1. Datorită costanţei în campionat şi în ciuda United-ului (Barcelonei) aflate aproape, City (Madrid) rămâne totuşi favorită la titlu.
Friday, 16 December 2011
SAN - BCN
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| From Neymar-Messi to Pelé-Cruijff |
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| June 1959 |
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| July 1960 |
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| June 1963 |
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| September 1974 |
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| August 1998 |
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| December 2011 |
[pies] Spot Steaua Bucharest’s Little Tifo Choreography Error?
So close…
edit: unii zic ca 9-le e intentionat intors pentru a marca a noua calificare in primavara europeana. Poate, dar cred ca daca asa e era mai simplu sa il faca mai vizibil
edit: unii zic ca 9-le e intentionat intors pentru a marca a noua calificare in primavara europeana. Poate, dar cred ca daca asa e era mai simplu sa il faca mai vizibil
[Jonathan Wilson] The Question: just how competitive is the Premier League?
Based on a study of world leagues, it may be that England's top flight is not the fierce contest its branding suggests
• To read part two of this series, click here
• To read part two of this series, click here
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| Norwich impressed at Old Trafford and showed the kind of spirit that is a Premier League selling point. They lost 2-0, however. |
It's the most competitive league in the world. Anybody can beat
anybody on their day. There are no easy games in this league. The mantra
of the Premier League
apologists is well known. Every time a team from the Little Fourteen
(as nobody ever calls them) plays a team from the Big Three (it is just
three now, right?) the cliches come trotting along: in our league nobody
gives anybody anything, everything's a glorious struggle.
It's
nonsense, of course: it's obvious the Premier League is a closed shop
that can be opened only with the application of around a quarter of a
billion pounds. In England in the past decade there have been three
different champions. That's the same as Spain, Italy and Portugal,
poorer than France (four), and Germany and Russia (five). But then in
the past decade there have been Champions League winners from England,
Spain, Italy and Portugal, and not from France, Germany or Russia. It
seems fairly obvious that competitiveness is something that must be
balanced against quality: would fans prefer an exciting domestic league,
or for teams from that league to do well in continental competition?
That's
not to say that a low number of different champions is necessarily a
sign of strength or high quality. In Croatia, Dinamo Zagreb have won the
league for the past six seasons and made next to no impression in
Europe. The problem, Igor Biscan said, is that their players get used to
winning easily; come a tough match, a game against a side of even
slightly lesser ability, in which they have to do things that don't come
naturally, like defending, they have no idea what to do. "Our players
walk through games against villages so they forget how to run," as a
Crvena Zvezda director put it to me a couple of years ago. "But what are
we meant to do? Buy players for the other teams in the league as well?"
Rangers and Celtic have perhaps suffered from that at times in Europe, which may mean that the domination of European football
by Barcelona and Real Madrid many have predicted is not quite so
sustainable as many think. That in turn is something to consider for
those who would tweak the balance of competition in the Premier League
by doing away with collective bargaining for TV rights (quite apart from
asking whether the product will remain so appealing if games are
hideously one-sided). That answer to the Zvezda official's question, in
fact, may end up being "yes", if only indirectly.
If you want a
true range of champions, you need to leave Europe. There have been six
different champions in Japan in the past decade, seven in Brazil. In
Argentina, where the apertura-clausura system
means there have been 20 championships in the past decade, there have
been 11 different winners – but there the spread of champions seems a
function of weakness, with the best players from the best sides being
skimmed off by predators from Europe and Brazil after each championship
in what's effectively a reverse of the draft system in US sports.
But
even if we accept competitiveness per se as a good thing, there are
different types of competitiveness. After all, while there have been
five different champions in the past decade in Germany, Bayern Munich
have won the title five times, the same number as Manchester United,
Barcelona and Internazionale (Porto and Lyon, incidentally, are the most
successful individual clubs in the 10 leagues considered with seven
titles each in the past decade). In effect, in Germany there is a Big
One and, if they fire, nobody else has much of a chance. Whether one
giant and a handful of occasional challengers is preferable to two or
three giants is debatable.
Looking at the number of champions,
though, says little about whether a team at the bottom can beat a team
at the top. To try to come up with a statistical basis for assessing
competitiveness within a league, I looked at four metrics across the 10
leagues (England, Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Portugal, Russia,
Brazil, Argentina and Japan) over the past decade: the average gap from
first to second at the end of the season (how dominant is the
champion?); the average gap from first to fourth (is it only two or
three teams who challenge the champion?); the average gap from first to
last (what's the gulf in quality from top to bottom?); and the average
gap from fourth to fourth-bottom (what's the difference in quality
between the mid-ranking sides?). Because different leagues have
different formats and are different sizes, these gaps have all been
expressed as points-per-game. (Points deductions were ignored).
|
Team
|
1st-2nd
|
1st-4th
|
1st-last
|
4th-4th last
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| England | 0.17 | 0.52 | 1.92 | 0.79 |
| Spain | 0.14 | 0.5 | 1.42 | 0.62 |
| Italy | 0.19 | 0.53 | 1.66 | 0.68 |
| Germany | 0.2 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 0.71 |
| France | 0.19 | 0.42 | 1.3 | 0.54 |
| Portugal | 0.27 | 0.72 | 1.68 | 0.64 |
| Russia | 0.11 | 0.34 | 1.49 | 0.68 |
| Brazil | 0.17 | 0.33 | 1.18 | 0.56 |
| Argentina | 0.17 | 0.46 | 1.5 | 0.7 |
| Japan | 0.19 | 0.36 | 1.39 | 0.62 |
In terms of exciting title races, it turns out that Russia is
the place to be, with Spain some way back, and the rest trailing far
behind. Perhaps not surprisingly, given Porto's domination, Portugal has
the highest gap from first to second, but what is striking is that
Germany has had the second-least-close title races over the past decade,
a fifth of a point-per-game separating first from second. The gap
between first and fourth in the Bundesliga, though, is the fourth
smallest of the 10 leagues surveyed, the gap from top to bottom the
third smallest and the gap from fourth to fourth-bottom the smallest.
That suggests that the leader often streaks away while the rest remain
relatively tightly bunched.
The biggest gap from first to fourth
is in Portugal. Again, that's in line with expectations: since the
second world war, only Belenenses and Boavista, once each, have
interrupted the flow of titles for Porto, Benfica and Sporting. There is
a very clear historical Big Three who continue to dominate. In Italy,
similarly, the two Milan clubs and Juventus (calciopoli
notwithstanding) have clearly been dominant. What is perhaps unexpected,
though, is that England have the third-biggest average gap from first
to fourth: perhaps the Big Four was always something of a myth.
Brazil
has the smallest gap from first to fourth, which it is tempting to
ascribe to the size of the country. A population of almost 200 million
can perhaps sustain more big clubs that smaller nations. It is also
worth noting, though, the relative immaturity of a national championship
in Brazil; it could be that as the present system becomes more
established, money and success gravitates to a more select few.
But
what's really telling is the last two columns, which show that there is
a bigger gap between top and bottom of the Premier League and between
fourth and fourth bottom in the Premier League than in any of the other
nine leagues under consideration. Far from being the most competitive
league in the world, in fact, it turns out to be the least. The league
where the bottom is closest to the top, rather, is Brazil, which is
remarkable when you consider that the statistics include the 28-team top
flight of 2001 and the slow contraction to 20 in 2006 – the more teams
there are, the wider you would expect that divide to be.
Now of
course an analysis of points tells only part of the story. It may be, in
some hard-to-quantify way, that lower Premier League teams fight harder
before losing to the big guns, and it certainly is true that the
culture of arranged games, mutually beneficial draws and the like, seems
less pronounced in England than elsewhere.
In terms of hard
statistics, though, the message is clear. The Premier League may lead
the way in terms of marketing and self-promotion, but if you want
competitiveness, go to Russia or Brazil.
Next week, I'll look at
how competitiveness has changed in England over time, what the reasons
for those changes may be and what the potential impact of scrapping
collective bargaining for television rights may be.
[guardian.co.uk] The Question: Is the 3-1-4-2 formation on the rise?
Something very odd happened at the end of last week. Historical
changes in tactics usually happen incrementally over time: there would
be rumours of a side doing something unusual ("and they say the
centre-forward plays in midfield …") followed by a pivotal game in which
that tactical change proves decisive and is accepted as a new phase in
football's development (Nandor Hidegkuti picks England apart while
scoring three in Hungary's 6-3 win at Wembley in 1953).
More
recently, perhaps, with the blanket televisation of football, it's been
possible to trace the evolution, but still, there tends to be one
moment, one game in which everything snaps into focus (Lionel Messi, for
instance, ripping Real Madrid apart from the false nine position)
As has now been well-documented, El Clásico turned on Pep
Guardiola's decision midway through the first half to abandon the
slightly odd 4-3-Cesc Fábregas-2 with which he had begun. He pushed Dani
Alves from right-back to right midfield, so he could check the runs of
Marcelo and cut off the support for Cristiano Ronaldo, a move that also
spared him from having to pretend he is a full-back which, as anybody
who has seen him play for Brazil will know, he is not.
That meant Carles Puyol moving to right-back, with Sergio Busquets
dropping in to become a second centre-back. Gerard Piqué became the
right-sided centre-back, allowing him to double up on Ronaldo when
required, while Alexis Sánchez moved to become a highly mobile
centre-forward (a false nine, if you like, but with lateral rather than
longitudinal movement). Messi operated as an orthodox 10, with Andrés
Iniesta shuttling on the left and Fábregas brought back much closer to
Xavi Hernández. At first, the formation looked like a highly fluent
4-2-3-1, as though Barça were going to match Real Madrid shape for
shape, but then the real benefit of the system became clear.
It is
often overlooked just how key Busquets is to initiating Barça attacks,
but he is always there as the get-out: if a player gets into trouble, he
can go back to Busquets. Block off the escape route, though, and
anxiety can be induced. Attack the metronome and the whole orchestra
loses rhythm. José Mourinho surprised many by opting for a 4-2-3-1
rather than a 4-3-3, but what it allowed him to do was press with five
men, leaving Lassana Diarra to protect the back four. That brought the
opening goal, but it also rattled Barça.
Moving Busquets back, though, gave him time and space. Withdrawn from
the front line, he could begin again to shape the battle. It was a risk,
because it left Mesut Ozil free, but he is a slightly old-fashioned
playmaker, somebody who is adept at finding time amid the hubbub to
measure a pass. Usually that is an asset, but here it gave Busquets time
to close him down. We are used to seeing Busquets dropping back from
midfield to become a centre-back; but here he was doing the opposite,
stepping out from the back four to become a midfielder. Perhaps this is
the logical outcome for a side that flips so often between a back three
and a back four: it ends up playing a back three-and-a-half.
First principles
But there is a deeper logic, and one that could be predicted [see the article about "is the sweeper coming back?].
When Jack Charlton made his famous comment after the 1994 World Cup
about full-backs being the most important position on the field, he was
specifically referring to the fact that when two 4-4-2s clash, the
full-backs are the players with a direct opponent. They are special not
because of anything inherent in being a full-back, but because they are
the players with the time and space to shape the game.
Football
has moved on, though, and the prevalence of 4-2-3-1 and 4-3-3 means that
full-backs often do have a direct opponent. That can create fascinating
tactical duels – Roberto Carlos v David Beckham as Real Madrid beat
Manchester United 3-1 in 2003, Theo Walcott v Danijel Pranjic as England
won 4-1 in Croatia in 2008, Michael Essien v Cristiano Ronaldo in the
Champions League final in 2008, Gareth Bale v Maicon as Tottenham beat
Internazionale last season – but it also means that the space that was
once the full-back's birthright is no longer guaranteed.
So where
is that space? If a team plays a back four against an opponent with a
lone central striker (or a false nine), then at least one of its
centre-backs should be spare. It's not quite the same as a full-back
being free in that it's clearly far easier for a single striker to
shuffle 10 yards to close down the other centre-back than it is for him
to run 30 yards to close down a full-back, but two centre-backs faced
with one forward trying to close them down should be able to work space
for one of them to step forward with the ball, at least until a
potential presser from the opposing midfield comes into play.
Two
years ago, I suggested we would increasingly see Piqué start to step
forward with the ball to join Busquets in midfield; actually the reverse
has happened and we have seen Busquets drop back to join Piqué (the
clue was in the influence of Bielsa on Guardiola; the Argentinian
visionary, also an inspiration for Universidad de Chile's coach Jorge
Sampaoli, has a habit of pulling midfielders back into defence, as he
has done with Javi Martínez at Athletic Bilbao). The effect is the same,
a central defender who steps out from the back, a playmaker from the
centre of defence.
An environment of change
And that is what makes Busquets's
role so fascinating – it facilitates a back three-and-a-half in a system
that presses. Again, there is a precedent, and perhaps it is not
surprising that it should be found in the heritage of this Barça: Johan
Cruyff's Barcelona
Dream Team of the early 90s, although they also lined up in a 4-3-3 or a
4-4-2, often played a 3-1-3-3, as did the Holland of Guus Hiddink. In
Cruyff's variant, Ronaldo Koeman was often the one, although Guardiola
himself operated there on occasions; but at Euro 96 Hiddink was playing
Clarence Seedorf in the role.
So Guardiola, to an extent, has gone
back to his roots, although there is a difference between the roles of
Koeman and Busquets, if only in how opponents line up against them.
Where Cruyff's 3-1-3-3 was rooted in the Rinus Michels belief that you
played as many defenders as the opponent had forwards, plus one, and so
Koeman was effectively free until there was an attack down the flank at
which he had to drop back to become a second centre-back, Guardiola's –
on Saturday at least – was predicated on Busquets staying deep (like
Koeman deeper than the opposition midfield, but actually deeper than
Koeman because the general trend from three-band to four-band systems
means the first wave of opposing midfield tends to play higher) and
stepping up when the opposing playmaker came into the game.
And
that brings us to the other recent sighting of the back
three-and-a-half, which was in the Spanish Super Cup. Applying first
principles to the issue of tackling a false nine, it
makes sense to play a back three and track the opposing false nine with
the player who would have been the second centre-back, whether a
defender or a holding midfielder. That was precisely how Mourinho
deployed Ricardo Carvalho against Messi, with some success, even if the
result ended up going against Real Madrid – again, the result being a
back three with a player who often played in the back line but did not
remain there.
So that gives us four examples this season, of teams
playing a 3-1-4-2. All had different motivations. For Real Madrid, it
was to free a player to man-mark. For Universidad de Chile, it was to
provide the cover that allowed the wing-backs to engage Liga de Quito's
wing-backs high up the pitch. For Rwanda it was to wrest control of the
midfield through weight of numbers in the centre. For Barcelona it was
to create space for their conductor. If there are four separate routes
to a single solution, that suggests there is not a sole cause.
So,
why now? It comes back, as tactics always do, to space. The prevalence
of systems with one or no central strikers means that for much of the
last decade, one of the centre-backs has been spare. To an extent,
that's quite useful in itself, providing additional defensive cover. But
there are more interesting things that can be done with him, and it is
that that football is only just beginning to explore.
Wednesday, 14 December 2011
[Sid Lowe] Further reflections from the clásico
Some more postgame thoughts following Barcelona's 3-1 win over Real Madrid in the clásico:
Carles Puyol
Barcelona's very own Captain Caveman, with his heart on his sleeve and his hair in his eyes. A real captain too and far more important than some realize. Carles Puyol was absent the last seven times Barcelona lost. You have to go back 44 games to find the last time they were defeated with him in the side. Since then, it's 37 wins and 7 draws with him, 33 wins, 10 draws 7 defeats without. Coincidence? No. It is Puyol who maintains the tension and edge -- Gerard Piqué gigglingly recalls the time Puyol screamed at him to focus even though Barcelona were 3-0 up, there were barely minutes left and the physics were on attending to an injured teammate -- and brings aggression and organization to a defense, to a whole side, that occasionally lacks it. He brings them calm when necessary, too. When Barcelona let in the first goal after 22 seconds, Puyol acted immediately -- getting in the face of everyone. Everyone except goalkeper Victor Valdés, with whom his words were rather quieter. And, for all the pressure, the message wasn't to stop playing passes and start booting it but to do quite the opposite.
Andrés Iniesta
Astonishing.
Pepe
An excellent defender whose wild hacks -- all legs and arms flailing about, feet ending up way above his head like Bobby Charlton post-30-yarder in 1966 -- and desire to do everything faster and harder, not just to clear the ball but to try to burst it, are an unnecessary risk.
The ref
The man who normally gets blamed. This time, some wanted a red card for Leo Messi but even the Madrid newspapers, proud of being partisan, admitted that the Argentine should not have been sent off. And although Jose Mourinho said he thought there should have been a red card when it happened -- at the time, he leapt to his feet complaining and turned to the fans, gesturing for them to play their part -- he admitted afterward that he couldn't be sure because he was a long way away and the ref was closer. "I don't want to say until I have seen a reply," he said. Which probably suggests he already had seen a replay. The first yellow was petty -- Messi was booked for telling the referee that he wasn't giving Barcelona anything but, according to the official report, there was no abuse, no swearing -- and the second offense was a pretty ordinary foul on Xabi Alonso. That said, rule book in hand, a red would not have been a complete scandal. And there has not been a complete scandal either, which is good. It's nice to have a clásico fall out that does not hinge on some ludicrous conspiracy theory. You might not know who the ref was on Saturday night. Let's keep it that way.
Speaking of fallout
All across the Madrid media there were few complaints, just a recognition that Madrid had beaten again -- and justly. On Monday, though, Marca had spun into everything's fine propaganda mode, designed to defend and laud the man that really matters. And, no, it's not necessarily Mourinho. There were no recriminations, no analysis, no criticism. Three pages, including the cover, are dedicated to president Florentino Pérez going down to the dressing room and giving the players "strength" and support, his appearance proving a comforting "balm" as, with "entereza" (roughly, strength in adversity), he told them they could still win the league. The headline reads: "Florentino comes onto the pitch." Because that's worked so well before. Page four led on the captains of the team apparently backing Cristiano Ronaldo. Page five featured Alfredo Di Stéfano's column which takes the blame for not wearing his lucky sweater -- luck deserted us, he says, but defeat will bring even more meaning to the league. And page 6 declares Mourinho to have been "up to the task" -- for, erm, shaking Pep Guardiola's hand.
Cesc Fabregas
At times, still doesn't look entirely comfortable in a role that is still new to him, off the forward, and occasionally appeared unsure as to where to move on Saturday night. But Cesc now has eight goals this season -- and, perhaps surprisingly, offers an aerial presence few Barcelona players can.
Karim Benzema
The result inevitably diminishes his role, eclipsing his performance, but Barcelona's victory should not blind us to the way that Benzema played.
Madrid's best player by far. Skillful, clever, powerful and quick. And coolheaded. Scored the first, provided what should have been the second for Ronaldo, and was intelligent and incisive throughout.
Luck? The Special One and success
Mourinho said that luck had played a big part in this result and you could sort of see his point -- Ronaldo's miss, Xavi's goal, Kaká's shot going wide off Valdés' elbow. When it was put to him, he also conceded that the results against Barcelona had not gone his way. Although he could not remember the exact numbers, he has won just one clásico of eight against Barcelona. He claimed the one that he did win -- the final of the Copa del Rey -- was the most important but that is not really true. And, anyway, he said, the figures are one thing but with the passage of time people forget how results happened. He then noted the red card for Pepe and the disallowed goal and left the sentence trailing -- a kind of verbal "..." that invited other reasons to be added. Reasons? Excuses. Excuses the likes of which were not entertained when he won --- with Porto, Chelsea or Inter. Instead, an objective fact was presented in the form of his trophies.
All of which is quite right and on Saturday night he might even have had a point. But it clashed with his legend that is built around him, the one that is founded on a single fact: Mourinho wins. The reality is that against Barcelona, he has not so far. That is the risk of reducing the narrative to success. There is no doubt that Madrid has improved and that it is a fantastically good team, winning 15 on the trot going into this match. It might even be favorite to win the league still. But the one team against whom it is truly measured is Barcelona and against Barcelona it was defeated again. If your entire identity is based on winning, the day you stop winning you have nothing. All the more so in Mourinho's case because he was explicitly brought in to defeat Barcelona. The question, and it is even being asked by his supporters, is: what now, Mou?
Pep Guardiola
It is often assumed that Guardiola wins simply because he has the best players. It shouldn't be. This was a tactical success too, switching from a back four to a back three with Sergio Busquets dropping into and out of the defense. Iniesta went left, Alves right and Messi was everywhere. Only Alexis really played up front, dashing across the line to keep Madrid's defense occupied -- snarling and competing and diving. And finishing brilliantly when he got the chance.
Cristiano Ronaldo (and, inevitably, Leo Messi)
It's all Ronaldo's fault, apparently. A section of the Santiago Bernabéu whistled Cristiano Ronaldo, a readers' poll on Marca's website gave him an average rating of 1.8 out of 10 and the paper itself rated him as 0 out of 3. One of the things that no one picked up on was that every time Ronaldo faced Gerard Piqué he dived -- as if he did not trust himself to go beyond the defender. What they did pick up on was what Jose Mourinho noted. Madrid's coach claimed that the game might have been different had Ronaldo taken his chance at 1-0. And there was the fluffed header in the second half. "Ronaldo is a fantastic player," the coach said, "and he normally scores them."
That "normally" is the point. On Monday morning the sports newspaper AS led on "Cristiano breaks down against Barcelona." Ronaldo's average is better than a goal a game, yet against Barcelona he only has a goal every 301 minutes and in 10 matches against them as a Real Madrid player he has only won once. This was not the first time he has missed a golden opportunity against Barça. He even missed a penalty against them for Manchester United.
So the old argument re-emerged: Ronaldo as a flat track bully, scoring irrelevant goals against irrelevant teams. He can't do it in big games, they say. Others noted the psychological anxiety he suffers when he comes up against Barcelona -- and Messi.
First of all, big games are by definition the hardest ones against the hardest opponents. Secondly, Ronaldo scored the winner in the Copa del Rey (Manchester United fans will recall that he scored in the Champions League final too), it is hard to make judgments on what's going on in his head, and focusing all the attention on a single player is unfair. As for the rubbish against Barcelona argument, many players are rubbish against Barcelona.
Perhaps the problem comes with his status. Ronaldo is a very, very good player -- a brilliant one, in fact -- but probably not at the level that has been created by? for? him. The fact that he has become Madrid's franchise player helps to foster rejection -- not all of it really of his own making -- while his personality does that too. Most of the "arrogant" remarks he makes are actually delivered tongue in cheek and there is a certain charm about him one on one, but the posturing on the pitch is provocative, even for his own fans. The fact that he dominates everything and not always to great success -- he has taken 22 free kicks this season and not scored one, for example -- makes him an obvious target.
And then there are the inevitable comparisons with the man against whom he is so often measured. The best photo to come out of the clásico appeared in Marca. It showed Ronaldo appearing to go down on one knee before Messi, bowing in deference, recognizing the Argentine's superiority.
Messi
That picture.
Tuesday, 13 December 2011
Mou crede că Barça a câştigat datorită norocului, şi are dreptate:
Norocul de a fi conduşi de Pep şi Tito …
Norocul de a-i fi semnat pe Cesc şi Alexis…
Norocul de a avea oameni ca Villa, Pedro şi Thiago pe bancă…
Norocul de a avea cel mai bun sistem de juniori din lume..
Şi bineînţeles - NOROCUL de a-l avea pe D10S jucând în cea mai bună echipă din istorie.
Monday, 12 December 2011
Friday, 9 December 2011
The Madrid manager seemed to be in good form – snarky – when he
claimed that the UEFA translator changing an answer given in English
into Spanish had missed out a large chunk of his response to a question
from Dutch TV in regards to last season’s match which produced sudden
yellow cards for his players and a UEFA suspension for Mourinho.
And
to be fair to Mourinho, that had happened with the translator dutifully
reporting that the Madrid coach was delighted to be back in Amsterdam
but failing to reproduce his remarks that only he has been punished by
the organisation for forcing yellow cards and not anyone else.
Asked
by the press to repeat everything in Spanish, Mourinho huffed “I’m not a
translator” – a claim that will never find agreement among Barcelona
fans.















